THE SOVIET DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ANALYSIS

 

Entire courses in both military and civilian academies could and should be devoted to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as the rippling consequences for the three main nations involved continue to make waves. Ironically, the Soviet invasion and subsequent defeat at the hands of the Mujahideen and their American allies marked the end of an era that had sown bitter resentment for over thirty years. True, by the time the Red Army withdrew in 1989 the Cold War was in its dying embers, but losing this final foothold proved almost as devastating for the USSR as the loss of the Spanish-American War proved for Spain, leading to sunken national moral, economy and the coup de grace for the Soviet Union before its collapse.

Perhaps, however, the United States ultimately fared worse, the abandonment of Afghanistan ushering a new era of geopolitical terrorism armed by the very weapons we left behind. But the people of Afghanistan fared worst of all, the nation left ruined by war finding itself vulnerable to the hands of terrorists.

Why Russia invaded Afghanistan is easy to understand. With America, its rival since the end of WWII, cultivating a considerable support base in the Middle and Near East (notably Israel and Jordan), Afghanistan, ruled by the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, was an attractive spot for the USSR to make its move in the region.

Likewise, it is not hard to understand why the Afghanistan’s leader, Hafizullah Amin, welcomed the help of a communist superpower to squash the rebellion of the Mujahideen, which was becoming increasingly angry over the dismantling of Sharia law. Finally, it is also in line with Ronald Reagan’s tactics to align himself with the Mujahideen in a trade of arms to bring down a common enemy. As he did with Manuel Noriega, Reagan was willing to join forces with an enemy of his enemies, especially Communist governments.

What should be analyzed deeper is why the Red Army lost the Soviet-Afghan War after a decade. Superficially, the reasons seem clear. Armed with weaponry supplied by the United States, the Mujahideen were a formidable foe with a willingness to any sacrifice. For all its conflicts throughout the 20^th century, Russia had yet to face an adversary with such resolve.

This should not be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Army was lacking in strength and training, but this was a very different sort of opponent. Much of the combat training the Soviet troops received reflected the largescale warfare the motherland had endured in the past century, leaving it inexperienced for the guerilla tactics of the Mujahideen.

Favorable to the Mujahideen was the desert terrain, offering ample areas for sudden duck and cover, while the Soviets lacked adequate equipment for fighting outside of dense forests.

As historian Lester W. Grau stated in his The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, “Several combat principles lay at the heart of the mujahideen’s tactics. First, they avoided direct contact with the superior might of regular forces which would have wiped them out. Second, the mujahideen practically never conducted positional warfare and, when threatened with encirclement, would abandon their positions. Third, in all forms of combat, the mujahideen always strove to achieve surprise.”

In addition, he says, “The mujahideen did not accommodate the Soviet Army by fighting a norther-European-plain war. They refused to dig in and wait for Soviet artillery. The Soviets found that massed artillery and simple battle drills had little effect on the elusive guerillas.”

Grau goes on to say, “The mujahideen knew the terrain intimately, were natural scouts, and were capable of rapidly transmitting the necessary information about secret Soviet unit and subunit movements over great distances using rudimentary communications gear and signaling devices. Among the guerilla forces’ tactical strong suits were all types of night actions, the ability to rapidly and clandestinely move in the mountains, and the fielding of a very broad agent reconnaissance network.”

It is important to note, however, that Russia’s lack of preparedness was as much psychological as it was practical. For the war it faced in Afghanistan was different from any war it fought before not only in landscape and method of fighting but also in spirit.

“Ideologically, the Soviet leadership was unable to come to grips with war in Afghanistan,” says Grau. “Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a “war of national liberation” where people would fight against a Marxist regime. So, initially the press carried pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphanages and did not mention that they were also engaged in combat and filling those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press had only reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that time, the 40^th Army had suffered 6, 262 dead 9,880 combat wounded.”

When the number of casualties and artillery (451 aircraft, 147 tanks, 1,314 army vehicles and 433 guns) lost could no longer be hidden, it became practically impossible for the Soviet government to justify the war to a disillusioned and angered populace. This situation would be paralleled in Afghanistan where the Soviet Army began losing the support even of the population initially in favor of their occupation as many of them, and their children, were becoming caught in the crossfire.

Despite how the war was being sold, though, the Soviet government knew the war would attract the ire of the West more so than that of the Mujahideen as it was, indeed, intended as a affront to the West. Tellingly, the Soviet Union launched its initial invasion to Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979, a day more likely to catch the United States off guard than an Islamist army.

Undoubtedly, underestimating the strength of the Mujahideen’s resistance was a costly mistake but economics and Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power were the ultimate key factors leading to the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The war became a tremendous economic strain, one the Soviet Union could neither justify nor afford. In this state, the sanctions placed by the United States were nearly as lethal as the weaponry.

For all his declaration of reforming Russia’s role in global affair, it is likely Gorbachev was motivated as much by finances as he was by making concessions to the United Nations when he announced the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1985. A half-hazard attempt was made to prepare the Democratic Party of Afghanistan to carry on after the retreat of their allies, but the Soviet influence was largely over after treaties were signed in 1988. By early 1989, Soviet presence had effectively disappeared from Afghanistan.

So would the US presence soon after. Its old Cold War enemy having faced a costly and humiliating defeat, the United States had little interest in Afghanistan. But there would be no winners here. The people of Afghanistan were left in ruin with little more than the artillery left behind. A devastated people are easy prey for violent jihadists. Sadly, we know the rest.